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Introduction to “New Governance and
the Business Organization”
Special Issue of Law and Policy

CRISTIE FORD and MARY CONDON

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

The point of departure for this exciting collection of articles is to advance the
scholarly treatment of “new governance” by shifting its focus away from
what regulators do or how they do it, and towards examining the encounter
between new governance and business organizations, within those
organizations themselves.1 As is evident from this issue, this shift still
provides a broad canvas on which to work, as the types of business
activity examined here through the lens of new governance encompass
railways, food safety, corporate privacy, and bank lending, as well as
securities and derivatives trading. A particular strength of the articles in this
issue is the presentation of original empirical research, ranging from
surveys of business in the UK food sector (Hutter) and a case study of
corporate

restructuring

(Sarra)

to

interviews with privacy officers

(Bamberger and Mulligan), bankers (Conley and Williams), and corporate
monitors (Ford and Hess). While most of the papers focus on specific
domestic contexts for business activity, Conley and Williams’ paper is
pitched at the global take up of the Equator Principles for project
lending, and Ford and Hess comment on comparisons between Canada
and the United States in the implementation of corporate monitorship
programmes.
The editors of this issue are committed to the idea that the analysis of new
governance needs to move beyond theory into practice and implementation.
Accordingly, we do not engage in an exhaustive description of the contours
of the phenomenon in this introduction. We also do not engage with the
distinctions between discrete versions of new governance or between new
governance and related regulatory approaches. Much of this mapping has
been ably undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g., Gilad 2010; Wisconsin Law Review
2010; de Búrca and Scott 2006, 2007). What is relevant for our purposes is the
broad agreement in the literature around several elements central to new
governance. The first is a restructured and more collaborative relationship
between the state and regulated entities, based on the recognition that
regulation may operate most effectively when it incorporates private
actors’ context-specific experience and relevant expertise (Freeman 1997;
Grabosky 1995), as well as potentially the experience and expertise of
other nonstate actors (Parker 2002). This may extend to public recognition
and enforceability of “rules” developed by nonstate actors (Meidinger
2006; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Second, new governance imagines
giving regulated entities greater autonomy to design their own internal

processes to meet broadly defined outcomes (Lobel 2004; Coglianese and
Lazer 2003). This freedom is counterbalanced by mechanisms designed to
force transparency and accountability. Specifically, the articles in this issue
connect to new governance from the particular vantage point of business
organizations’ compliance functions, internal governance mechanisms,
and/or self-regulation. New governance has special relevance to such
functions because it envisions a dynamic and endogenously developed
understanding of governance and compliance (Ford 2008). The focus on
developing regulatory strategies that place responsibility on organizations
for their own compliance, and that try to foster or engage with authentic
compliance-supporting internal motivations, is of central importance to the
current project.
Third, the theoretical new governance approach emphasizes problemsolving and experimentation in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies
(Sabel and Simon 2004; Sparrow 2000). Moreover, because of our
preoccupation with implementation, this issue has a particular affinity
with the most explicitly pragmatic, learning-by-doing versions of new
governance, notably experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Finally, some
new

governance

and

related

scholarship

incorporates

broader

emancipatory, democratic, or neo-republican concerns (Shearing and Wood
2003; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). While that more
ambitious

agenda

is

not

fully

engaged

here,

broad

stakeholder

participation and “voice” is a fourth theoretical underpinning, essential
to both legitimacy and effectiveness, and it is touched on in some form
by all of the authors in this issue.

The authors each take as his or her point of departure a specific set of
features of new governance in which they ground their specific analyses. For
example, while Hutter emphasizes the decentralization of regulation and
changing notions of the degree to which the regulated are held responsible for
developing internal governance processes, both Bamberger and Mulligan, as
well as Ford and Hess, foreground the revisability and experimentation
aspects of new governance thinking. It is possible therefore that, as some
argue, the definition of new governance itself is constituted and reconstituted
during

evolving

interactions

among

organizations

around

specific

governance mechanisms (Huising and Silbey 2009).
Another reason for the focus in this issue on understanding the
implementation of new governance ideas is that the global financial
crisis of 2007–2009 arguably exposed some shortcomings both in
regulatory capacity and in financial firms’ willingness to self-monitor
towards the end of systemic stability. The articles presented in this
issue provide a vantage point for a more nuanced assessment of the
possibilities and limits of new governance going forward. We note the
interesting diversity of views, ranging from scepticism to cautious
optimism, ultimately expressed in these articles concerning the continued
salience of new governance approaches after the crisis. The articles
presented here individually contain rich seams of analysis bearing on the
question of the extent to which, and how, new governance becomes
embedded in a variety of organizational locations. However, a number of
cross-cutting themes may also be identified.

I. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES

In its own way, each article recognizes that background conditions impact
the way in which new governance processes get implemented, which may
point towards the ultimate success or failure of such initiatives. Some
iterations of the new governance literature derive from the idea of
“regulatory capitalism,” that is, the proposition that regulation has
adopted a middle road between pure state service provision and extensive
deregulation, pushing the state to adopt a facilitative and cooperative
stance towards business in regulating its activities (Levi-Faur 2005,
2009). In an article originally presented at the conference that sparked
this special issue, Christine Parker (2009) argued that new governance
style “enforceable undertakings,” or corporate monitorships, are a logical
consequence of regulatory capitalism’s need to navigate around the
“traps” of potentially ill-fitting compliance strategies and potentially illfitting deterrence ones. Meanwhile, Hutter identifies a shift away from a
controlling and towards a “constitutive” conception of regulatory action
with respect to business activity (Shearing 1993). She also pays attention to
the specifics of industry structure (how many sophisticated organizations,
how many small actors) as relevant conditions for the uptake of new
governance initiatives. Ford

and

Hess

tease

out

the

notion

of

“organizational culture” (including fears of liability and patterns of
expertise-based homogeneity) as both a motivation for the creation of

corporate monitorships in the first place and, ultimately, an obstacle to their
success (as Ford and Hess define success). Finally, Conley and Williams
acknowledge that the difficulties of imposing command-and-control–type
regulation on multinational companies are part of the landscape in which
the Equator Principles have flourished.

II. RISK MANAGEMENT AS NEW GOVERNANCE

In a number of these articles, risk management emerges as an overarching
form of new governance, involving as it does a shift away from a
preoccupation with compliance with external legal norms and towards an
enterprise of containing and managing risks to an organization emanating
from a variety of sources (including, of course, the risk of various legal
liabilities). Condon has noted that the scholarship on risk regulation and
that on new governance has tended not to extensively converge; the articles
in this issue are emerging examples of that valuable cross-pollination
(Condon 2007). Accordingly, Hutter’s article most explicitly recognizes
both risk regulation and the risk management responses of organizations as
forms of new governance, while her empirical research demonstrates the
difficulties of actually implementing risk management strategies throughout
even sophisticated organizations. Bamberger and Mulligan frame their
discussion of emerging corporate practices around privacy in terms of the
increasingly pervasive understanding of privacy “as a risk to be managed
rather than a matter of legal compliance.” In contrast to Hutter, their
research points to an optimistic outcome whereby the “integration of

privacy into existing decision making structures . . . promotes privacy’s
consideration as a systemic risk, consistent practices across firm units,
and the commitment of employees from across the firm” (p. 504).
Meanwhile, Conley and Williams are cautiously optimistic about the
progressive role to be played by the market-based Equator Principles as a
form of quasi-regulation, in large part because adherence to these principles
allows lending banks to manage their own financial risks. Finally, Sarra
considers the increasing use of equity derivatives by financial market
participants, in terms of the implications of that trading strategy for
traditional understandings of the rationale for shareholder “voice” in
corporate decision-making. To the extent that entering into derivatives
transactions is an exercise in risk management for those shareholders,
Sarra’s article suggests that shareholders are increasingly signalling that
derivatives transactions are a more effective market-based strategy for
risk management than the capacity to exercise “voice” in corporate
decision making. More generally, however, an increasing focus on risk
management as a strategy of governance in business organizations raises
difficult issues about who will ultimately be able to participate in
governance processes, since risk management has been conceived in the
academic literature as a process that privileges technocratic and “expert”
knowledge (Power 2007; Beck 1992).

III. AGENCY, VOICE, AND EXPERTISE IN NEW GOVERNANCE

The articles in this issue deal with a cluster of issues revolving around where
agency for new governance initiatives is or is not located in organizational
contexts. A related issue, mentioned above, is charting the significance of
particular bodies of “expertise” in implementing or shaping such initiatives.
Hutter’s article contains a valuable assessment of different stakeholders’
relative agency within the food safety sector. Interestingly, her research on
that sector in the UK domestic context did not accord much agency to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as an influence on business
practices. This is in contrast to Conley and Williams’ article, which accords
high significance to the role of environmental NGOs as a factor in pushing
financial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles into their lending
practices. Ford and Hess describe the corporate monitorship process as one
in which the corporate entity seeks to retain as much agency as possible over
the scope of the work conducted by the monitors, though their dissatisfied
view of the outcomes to date is ultimately connected to the lack of
enthusiasm they find among ex-prosecutor corporate monitors to achieve
expansive goals.
Meanwhile, Sarra’s article spans several different locations for addressing
questions of agency in new governance: her case study of the Algoma Steel
corporate restructuring and her analysis of the role of equity derivatives in
corporate governance. With respect to the former, she finds the capacity of
the corporation’s employees to exercise agency in that restructuring to be
partial and contingent. With respect to the latter, she ultimately locates

agency for corporate governance outcomes in the market innovation of
equity derivatives themselves. Finally, while Bamberger and Mulligan focus
primarily on internal actors (privacy officers) as agents of change in the
privacy context, they also see a significant role for the “activist regulator” in
promoting the responsibilization of these internal change agents.
A recurring theme is scepticism about the possibilities for broad citizen
involvement in new governance processes, even while the importance of
striving towards this goal is reinforced. While Hutter’s article references the
importance accorded to consumers as an influence on the activities of food
managers, Conley and Williams find that “[A]t almost every turn in
corporate social responsibility practice, including the EPs project,
someone else speaks for the local communities that are its presumed
beneficiaries” (p. 568). As noted above, Sarra’s findings with respect to the
role of employees in the Algoma Steel restructuring were that that influence
was highly contingent on a temporary and politically supported possession
of economic leverage. Finally, responding to their concerns about the
expertise-based and insular world of enforced corporate monitorships, Ford
and Hess examine the possibilities for achieving increased public
participation in the monitorship regime.
In implementing new governance processes, the significance to be accorded
to specific bodies of “expertise” is highly contextual and situation dependent.
Here again we see several different stories. For Hutter, there is a lesson from
her research on the railway industry related to the difficulty of implementing
effective strategies for dealing with occupational health and safety problems
throughout the organization. She notes, in characterizing the experience of

British Rail (BR) with self-regulation around these requirements as “more
procedural than substantive,” that “BR was a complex organization
comprising a diversity of professions, encompassing a variety of businesses
. . . This led potentially to a great source of variation” (p. 468). Meanwhile,
Bamberger and Mulligan point to the development of a new profession of
“chief privacy officer,” as well as the integration of a “network of specially
trained employees into business lines as a means of identifying and
addressing privacy concerns,” as critical to successfully governing
privacy in the business organizations studied (p. 488). Conley and
Williams also point to the emerging role of consulting firms used to
prepare environmental and social impact assessments for those seeking
loans from global banks.
Ford and Hess reflect on the poor fit between the professional expertise
of the ex-prosecutors who typically become corporate monitors, and the
expansive role intended for those monitors, especially with respect to the
ongoing development of learning about best practices that may be gleaned
from specific examples of implementation. On the other hand, Ford and
Hess remain cautious about whether a complete solution to this problem
would lie in the development of a profession of “corporate monitor” with
more organizational compliance expertise, because of the potential for
insularity, homogeneity, and lack of public accountability that may result.

IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

A number of the articles speak to whether it is possible to identify factors
that motivate organizations to embed new governance processes internally.
There is some convergence evident in the Conley and Williams, Bamberger
and Mulligan, and Hutter articles, as they all reference external pressures,
whether from consumers, the public, or the idea of “reputational risk.”
Conley and Willams and Sarra also reference economic self-interest as a
driver of participation in new governance initiatives. This point bears further
examination, however, because one of the key insights of Sarra’s article is
indeed that shareholders’ self-interest with respect to debates about optimal
corporate governance has changed with the decoupling (via derivatives) of an
economic interest from the legal rights traditionally embedded in the
shareholding relationship. In other words, the economic interests of
shareholders are not static but are themselves reconstituted in the
process of negotiating corporate governance norms (Hutter, this issue;
Condon 1998). Ford and Hess find a general lack of enthusiasm among
the businesses researched to embrace the fundamental organizational
changes proposed by monitorships—thereby reinforcing their conviction
that meaningful enforcement matters—though, since these initiatives follow
on the heels of regulatory enforcement processes, their organizational
subjects are unlikely to be “compliance leaders” anyway (Thornton,
Gunningham, and Kagan 2005). This lack of enthusiasm may also in part
speak to the question of “capacity” noted by Hutter as a key predictor of
the likely success of new governance initiatives.

V. NEW GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

Some scholars of new governance are quick to point out that the horizontal
and experimental approach they advocate will not be successful in the
absence of a rigorous enforcement regime (Ford 2005; Karkkainen 2004).
For example, Hutter insists that states are required to assess whether or not
to take drastic action against businesses that are “persistently incapable” of
managing risk. Some of the articles in this issue take on the question of what
a new governance-inspired enforcement program for regulation might look
like. As we have noted above, Ford and Hess’s article on corporate
monitorships is an example of the kind of cultural experimentation that
new governance advocates in the enforcement sphere. Interestingly,
Conley and Williams’ article raises the issue of whether the Equator
Principles analysed therein could work as a substitute for the lack of
enforcement of environmental norms by particular jurisdictions. New
governance engages with the broader socio-legal debate about enforcement
effectiveness by pointing to the need for creativity and remaining sensitive
to context, while acknowledging enforcement’s continued importance in
the regulatory toolkit.

CONCLUSION

A final question for an introduction that seeks to synthesize the findings of a
diverse set of articles is whether there are generalizable insights to be derived
therein. In our view, the “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973, 6) of specific

organizational contexts that these articles provide are precisely the point.
Generalizable conclusions—in the sense of “off the rack” theoretical
recommendations that can be applied with minimal regard to context and
situation—do not present themselves here. This should not be a surprise at
this stage. Rather, these case studies and others like them are the context-rich
material required to develop a set of relevant questions that those involved in
new governance efforts could be considering. Taken together, these articles
reinforce a conviction that we alluded to at the beginning of this
introduction: that granular stories about actual new governance efforts
shed crucial light on how programs are implemented within business
organizations.
We might even imagine a provisional matrix of sorts going forward, which
tries to draw out learning from these and other accounts. Among other
elements it would consider extant context—the nature of the industry in
question (Hutter) or of an enforceable background rule of law norm (Conley
and Williams). It would demand conscious attention to the location of
agency, the precise nature of different actors’ capacities, and power.
Particular forms of expertise will be salient in particular contexts. Our
provisional matrix would therefore call for an intimate understanding of
the relevant actors—of why internal actors can be effective change agents
in the Federal Trade Commisison (FTC) privacy context, for example
(Bamberger and Mulligan); of why ex-prosecutors do not function
perfectly as corporate monitors (Ford and Hess); and of the conditions
under which a broader group of stakeholders is accorded a voice in highstakes decisions, such as the Algoma Steel restructuring (Sarra). Equally

important would be a clear-eyed appraisal of what particular factors,
beyond the sphere of short-term self-interest, are expected to stimulate
change in a particular situation. Given the apparently recurring problems
incorporating broad, direct stakeholder participation, new governance
scholars and practitioners also have to ask themselves how important
broad participation is to the approach (likely very important) and
whether and how the problem can be remediated in any particular
situation. The question is directly posed through these case studies and
demands a response.
Making new governance successes replicable across business organizations
requires not generality, but specificity, experimentalism, and pragmatism.
This is the kind of work called for in order to continue to deepen our
understanding of why new governance methods work when they do, what
their essential preconditions are, what considerations should be explicit in
formulating a new governance effort, and what some of the most perilous
steps may be in the translation from theory to practice.

NOTE

1. The origin of this special issue on new governance and the business organization
lies in a symposium held at The University of British Columbia in Vancouver,
Canada in May 2009, sponsored by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, the Law Foundation of British Columbia, and the National
Centre for Business Law at the University of British Columbia. The symposium
brought together an exciting and eclectic group of scholars from Canada, the
United States, England, and Australia, who collectively represented disciplines
such as law, business, information studies, sociology, and political science.
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